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Beyond Asylum Claims: Refugee Protest, Responsibility, and Article 28 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Protests by refugees and asylum seekers have become of increasing interest to scholars 
of forced migration, citizenship and political theory in recent years for the critical 
potential inherent in such acts of protest to reconfigure conceptions of ‘the political’, 
‘the citizen’, and refugees as voiceless, a-political victims. This paper turns to refugee 
and asylum seeker protest for a different reason. Rather than focusing on the act of 
protest, this paper turns to the substantive content of such protests. Exploring the claims 
and demands of refugees and asylum seekers in two long-running protest movements, 
in Austria and Germany, the paper argues that the protestors’ demands encompass more 
than the claim to asylum, and can fruitfully be understood as UDHR Article 28 rights 
claims – claims to a social and international order for the realisation of human rights. 
The paper argues that these claims are not easily addressed by existing approaches to 
responsibility for forced migration, and turns instead to Iris Marion Young’s conception 
of political responsibility for structural injustice as a potentially promising framework. 
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Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of coordinated protest movements of refugees and 
asylum seekers across Europe. They began in Germany, in 2012, and have spread to Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as to states on 
the periphery of the EU.1 Each protest was sparked by specific conditions on the ground, and 
they vary in size and tactics, but they all make concrete demands for better living conditions, 
contest the legal, political and economic exclusion of asylum seekers and irregular migrants 
from European society, and contest the withholding and withdrawal of rights. The protestors 
are mainly asylum seekers – both with pending claims for recognition under the Refugee 
Convention and with claims that have been denied – and their actions have spurred campaigns 
of citizens, recognised Refugees, and documented migrants across the continent in solidarity. 
Protest movements by irregular migrants have become of concerted interest to scholars of 
citizenship, largely because of the potential inherent in such acts to challenge and to reconfigure 
conceptions of ‘the political’, ‘the citizen’ and of forced migrants as voiceless, apolitical 
subjects.2 While this approach to refugee and asylum seeker protest is one that the author of 
this paper shares elsewhere,3 this paper turns to the protests for a different reason. Rather than 
the act of protest, it argues that important insights into challenges of human rights protection 
and questions of responsibility for forced migrants can be gained by focusing instead on their 
substantive content: the claims and demands made.  
Analysing the press releases, statements, letters, and videos made available by 
protesting refugees and asylum seekers in Austria and Germany on a series of blogs and social 
media pages that they maintain, the paper examines the claims for rights and recognition, and 
of responsibility, that the protestors make. It argues that they demand recognition of their status 
as refugees, human beings and rights bearers, the protection of their human rights, and claim 
that the global North bears a responsibility for the protection of these rights which is grounded 
in the socio-political and economic structures of global politics. In making these claims and 
demands the protestors do much more than claim asylum. They act as, in the words of one of 
the protestors in Germany, “whistle-blowers”: not just of failures or abuses in their states of 
origin, as their requests for asylum indicate, but of the political and socio-economic structures 
of global life, and of the everyday implication of ordinary citizens in them.4 In drawing 
attention to the flaws inherent in the international refugee regime and international human 
rights regime, themselves grounded in the very structure of international life, the protestors 
present a challenge not only to address their individual claims for recognition and rights – their 
asylum claims – but the very processes and structures that continue to prevent human rights 
being a reality of lived experience for growing numbers of people. Their claims are, thus, not 
simply for admittance as exceptions to an otherwise well-functioning status quo, but are, rather, 
claims that the status quo itself is untenable and needs to be addressed. Such claims are at root, 
this paper argues, claims to an often forgotten human right: Article 28 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “Everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth [in the UDHR] can be fully 
realised.”5 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section explains the purpose and 
contribution of the paper, situating it at the nexus of scholarship on human rights, forced 
migration, and political theory. The second section then examines two instances of refugee 
protest, in Germany and Austria, highlighting the different claims and demands made. 
Beginning at roughly the same time, these two protests provided the catalyst for protests that 
have followed elsewhere in Europe. They have also been the largest and have the most 
established online presence, which the protestors use to communicate not only with members 
of the movement but also with potential supporters and the wider community, providing an 
easily accessible source to understand the claims and demands that the protestors make. The 
third section introduces Article 28 of the UDHR and examines why a right which seems on the 
surface to have little to do with forced migration can, in fact, usefully be understood as central 
to the claims and demands made by the protestors. The fourth section then explores the 
questions of responsibility raised by the protestors and by interpreting their claims and 
demands as Article 28 rights claims. It will be argued that these claims raise important 
questions with which scholars of forced migration, human rights, and political theory should 
engage, and that Iris Marion Young’s conception of political responsibility for structural 
injustice provides a potential framework within which to do so. It will be concluded, however, 
that such an approach to addressing the claims and demands of the protestors cannot do without 
the cultivation of solidarity within and across borders, and that this is where the particular 
power (potential) of refugee protest movements lies. 
 Responsibility for forced migrants and their human rights: 
 
Scholarship on human rights, forced migration, and political theory has developed along 
largely separate tracks since the signing of the UDHR in 1948, the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees in 1951, and the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971. 
Links have been drawn between human rights and global poverty, but such work has tended 
not to focus on the issue of refugees and asylum seekers.6 Dialogue between human rights law 
and international refugee law is increasingly common, but tends to be restricted to points of 
law and questions of influence, rather than addressing questions of justice.7 There is a well-
established debate on whether duties of justice or humanitarianism are owed to refugees, but 
these debates have been limited in a number of ways, outlined below, and rarely address 
broader human rights questions beyond the provision of physical asylum. This article is a 
modest, and limited, attempt to show how these three fields are, and should be recognised as, 
intimately connected, and takes as its point of entry the vexed question of responsibility for the 
protection of forced migrants.8  
Responsibility for forced migrants has been conceptualised rather narrowly, and tends 
to fall into one of two paradigms. The first is that of state obligations under international 
refugee law.9 Responsibility, in this framework, is understood primarily in legal terms, and 
relates to obligations incumbent upon states under the refugee regime. Such legal 
responsibilities are minimal, being limited to a responsibility not to return any individual to a 
state where her life or freedom would be threatened on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, but with no corresponding duty to 
grant asylum to those who seek it. Burden-sharing is an important principle in the refugee 
regime, but this has not been translated into any formal legal obligations.  
The second paradigm of responsibility is more firmly entrenched within normative 
political theory and can be characterised in broad terms as a debate over the ethics of admission: 
when, if at all, and in relation to whom, state controls on immigration are permissible. Whether 
such work is concerned with refugees and asylum seekers specifically, or with the ethics of 
migration more generally, the question of responsibility tends to be state-centric in its focus. 
Walzer and Miller, for example, each take the rights of states to control their borders as the 
starting point for thinking through what responsibilities states might have toward foreign 
nationals seeking admission. For Walzer, the right to maintain “communities of character” 
restricts the duties of states to the principle of mutual aid, permitting a state to refuse entry to 
needy foreigners where the “character” of the community may be threatened.10 Miller grants 
to refugees the right to temporary sanctuary and aid, but the state’s right to self-determination 
may justify the exclusion of refugees, and certainly justifies the exclusion of other non-
nationals.11  
The majority of work on the ethics of admission portrays the state, further, as the only 
relevant bearer of responsibility: the question at hand is overwhelmingly the obligations or 
responsibilities of states. To a certain extent, this focus is justified. Whether or not globalisation 
will render the state obsolete in the future, it is still currently the case that states retain the 
power to decide who may cross their borders, and on what terms, and asylum requests are made 
of the state, not any other sub-national or trans-national actor. However, as has been argued by 
the emerging field of Critical Citizenship Studies, the state is neither the only, nor always the 
primary, community of belonging of influence and importance in global politics, nor of the 
politics of rights or migration.12 As McNevin has ably shown, non-citizens occupy various 
positions within the contemporary neoliberal state with which traditional debates in normative 
political theory have been reluctant thus far to adequately engage.13 None of this is an argument 
for dispensing with the state in attempting to think through responsibility for the protection of 
forced migrants. It is, however, an argument against an exclusive focus on the state.  
In addition to their state-centric nature, these debates also tend to proceed on the basis 
of abstract thought experiments, on the one hand, or an understanding of the “generic” refugee, 
on the other, rather than the concrete experiences and claims of forced migrants themselves. 
Refugees are often represented in a rather superficial, one-dimensional way, reducing them to 
a single act and utterance – the request for admission and physical security – and in which clear 
distinctions can, or should, be made between “political” and “economic” reasons for such a 
request. Broader questions of responsibility for human rights protection tend to be bracketed 
off, and focus given to the responsibility to provide physical asylum. This is not to say that 
abstract thought experiments – such as determining obligations to the needy stranger by way 
of analogy with the drowning child in the river – have no value in theorising, nor that the 
request for admission is not an important aspect of forced migrants’ need for rights protection. 
But what is sacrificed in pursuit of this abstraction or this simplification? And do political 
theorists run the risk of producing accounts of responsibility for protection that are logically 
coherent on their own terms, but which fail to correspond to the reality on the ground? These 
are the questions that motivate this article. Its purpose is not to contribute to the debates above 
on their own terms but, rather, to make an intervention into the broader issue of responsibility 
for protection of forced migrants by taking a different starting point altogether, thereby 
questioning the state-centric assumptions underpinning these debates, and by bringing human 
rights more squarely into focus. As such, this paper takes its cue not from normative political 
theory, but from Critical Citizenship Studies, and from its analyses of the emerging 
phenomenon of refugee and asylum seeker protest movements.  
Protests by irregular and non-status migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, 
have become of concerted interest to scholars of citizenship, largely because of the potential 
inherent in such acts to challenge and to reconfigure conceptions of ‘the political’, ‘the citizen’ 
and of forced migrants as voiceless, apolitical subjects. McNevin analyses how the political 
action of irregular migrants in France, the USA and Australia not only seek the extension of 
formal status, but also challenge the national and racial notion of citizenship in modern politics, 
and how, through their (unauthorised) actions, they rupture the very conceptual vocabulary that 
polices the boundaries of political belonging.14 Similarly, Nielsen and Isin argue that these 
movements of ‘non-citizens’ necessitate a complete rethink of our conceptual vocabulary and 
understanding of citizenship. Rather than a legal status that one possesses or is granted, 
citizenship is a performative practice that one enacts.15 Rather than focusing on the act of 
protest, however, this paper argues that important insights into questions of responsibility for 
the protection of the human rights of forced migrants can be gained by focusing instead on 
their substantive content: the claims and demands made. The focus of this paper thus diverges 
from that of Critical Citizenship Studies scholars, but the foundation of the analysis remains 
the same: what happens to understandings of core institutions and practices in the politics of 
migration if the analysis begins from the actions and voices of the migrant?  
Since migrants, particularly those lacking secure status or authorisation for their 
movement, live in a situation of precarity, there are a great many structural obstacles in place 
to prevent or disincentivise their speech and action in the public sphere, not least the fear of 
deportation or imprisonment. This makes theorising from their perspective a challenging, but 
not impossible task. Protest movements present an opportunity to engage with the voices and 
actions of forced migrants, as the purpose of such protests is precisely to make their concerns 
and wishes known to a wider audience than the civil servants charged with evaluating their 
asylum claims. However, the question of representativeness then inevitably arises. It may not 
be possible to discern with any real “accuracy” how representative the claims and demands of 
those involved in protests are of the wider group, since even so simple a measure as the 
numbers involved could be misleading. But the view taken here is that it is not necessary for 
such claims to be representative of all refugees and asylum seekers in order for them to present 
questions about responsibility and global human rights protection that are worth addressing; 
and it is to these questions that this paper now turns.  
 
Refugee and Asylum Seeker Protest – “We demand our rights!” 
 
Asylum seeker protest has been a feature of German politics for roughly twenty years,16 but 
the protest movement was reinvigorated in 2012, in response to the suicide of a 26-year-old 
Iranian asylum seeker, Mohammed Rahsepar, who had been held in a detention centre in 
Würzburg. In the months following his death, asylum seekers and recognised Refugees set up 
protest camps in various cities across Germany and, in September 2012, asylum seekers, 
Refugees and supporters began a 600km march to Berlin and established a protest camp in 
Orianenplatz.17 Hunger strikes, protest marches, and Refugee Liberation Bus Tours, 
coordinated under the umbrella of Refugee Tent Action, have occurred across Germany in the 
years since. The protestors demand: the abolishment of the Residenzpflicht, which prohibits 
asylum seekers from leaving the district in which they have been registered for any reason 
without permission; a halt to all transfers under the EU’s Dublin Regulation; the erasure of 
their fingerprints from the European identity database, EURODAC, which contains the 
fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular migrants to facilitate Dublin deportations; 
improvements to conditions inside asylum accommodation centres; the regularisation of 
Germany’s ‘tolerated’ asylum seekers, whose claims for protection have been refused but who 
cannot be deported, and who therefore exist in Germany without secure legal status and rights; 
and a recognition of all asylum seekers as Refugees, arguing that all reasons, including socio-
economic, that compel a person to leave his/her country of origin are, ultimately, political.18 
On November 24, 2012, in Austria, approximately one hundred asylum seekers and 
their supporters marched the 35km from the refugee reception centre in Traiskirchen to the 
centre of Vienna, and erected a Refugee Protest Camp in front of the Votive Church in Sigmund 
Freud Park. The camp remained in the park until it was broken up by the police on December 
28, 2012, at which point the protestors were welcomed into the church itself to maintain their 
camp. In March 2013, the protestors were invited to relocate to the Serviten Monastery, where 
they remained until the end of October that same year.19 Deteriorating conditions of detention 
for asylum seekers had provided the initial catalyst for the protests, but the protestors’ demands 
went beyond improved detention conditions. They demanded: that they be granted the right to 
remain in Austria or, at the very least, to have their fingerprints deleted from EURODAC 
should Austria decide to deport them; that they be granted the right to work, as they wished to 
sustain themselves rather than rely on the state;20 basic support for asylum seekers in Austria 
regardless of status; an end to enforced internal transfer to isolated rural areas; access to 
employment, educational institutions and social security; a halt to all Dublin deportations; the 
establishment of an independent review and appeal authority for asylum applications; and the 
recognition of the validity of  socio-economic motives behind refugee flight.21 
In addition to these concrete demands, the statements given by the protestors in press 
releases, interviews and press conferences reveal three kinds of broader inter-related claims: 
claims for rights, and claims for status/recognition, addressed below, and claims of 
responsibility, to be addressed later.  
Claims for rights 
The demands that the protestors made of Austrian and German authorities – for freedom of 
movement, choice of residence within Germany and Austria, access to education and 
employment, and basic social support – are all appeals to the authorities to respect the 
protestors’ human rights. The protestors in Germany linked their actions specifically to 
repeated violations of their human rights by the German authorities: “following a long tradition 
of refugee struggles against the violation of our human rights, we set up the Refugee Protest 
Camp at Orianenplatz…”22 Both protest movements framed their actions explicitly in rights 
language, both in the demand for recognition of specific rights (freedom of movement, access 
to education, and so on), and in framing those demands in terms of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. In the Austrian protests, for example, the protestors held a press conference 
as they established their camp, in which they specifically referenced Article 2 of the UDHR – 
which prohibits discrimination in regard to the provision and protection of human rights – both 
as justification for their actions, and as an indictment of Austrian asylum policies which use 
the protestors’ (lack of) legal status as a reason to deny access to these supposedly human 
rights.23 The protestors in Germany claim not only that their rights have been “stolen”24 but 
that this theft has been effected by the law itself: 
The conditions in which refugees live are excluding […] because states with economic and 
nationalist interest are capable to write laws against refugees and migrants which violate 
human rights. The same human rights that they have written and signed: the prohibition of 
freedom of movement, the banning of the right to free choice of residence and the banning 
of social participation, for example, participation in elections, etc., which have become 
law […] This is the open contradiction to human rights. This means that a refugee and/or 
migrant who is not from here has not the same human rights as a citizen of this country.25 
Paradoxically, perhaps, the rallying cry of the Austrian protestors, “We demand our rights!” 
positions the rights being demanded as those the protestors already possess: “We demand our 
rights!” Though this might appear to be simply an example of linguistic confusion, this is, 
rather, what Judith Butler refers to as a ‘performative contradiction’. When a disenfranchised 
group make a universal demand, they lay claim to something from which they have been 
constitutively excluded.26 In doing so, they draw attention to the injustice of being denied 
something that is supposed to be theirs. To draw attention to this exclusion is to reveal that the 
‘universal’ upon which these rights depend – human status – is not in fact, in its present 
configuration, a universal at all. The performative contradiction of demanding their rights 
draws attention to the extent to which the universal – human – rests upon the particular and 
exclusionary – legal status. 
Claims for status/recognition 
In demanding respect for their human rights, and the recognition of the validity of a broader 
range of causes of flight for recognition as a Refugee, the protestors make a claim for 
recognition of legal status as rights holders. Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention defines 
a Refugee as a person who: 
[…] owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country […]27 
Within the EU, protection is, in theory, available to some forced migrants who do not meet the 
criteria of Article 1A(2). Under Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, Subsidiary Protection 
can be granted to those who would face any of the following if they were returned to their 
country of origin: the death penalty or execution; torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; or “serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.” 28 
The protestors’ call for the recognition of socio-economic drivers of flight as valid for 
recognition as a Refugee are, thus, a claim for a formal legal status which would provide access 
to the protection of their human rights. Neither the Refugee Convention, nor the Qualification 
Directive explicitly provide for the extension of international protection to those fleeing serious 
violations of, or failures to protect, socio-economic rights. Foster and Hathaway have both 
demonstrated how a claim for Refugee status based upon persecution which manifests as severe 
violations of socio-economic rights could be successful, but they have also highlighted two 
fundamental obstacles. The first is that such claims will automatically fail if the persecution 
which manifests as violations of socio-economic rights cannot be linked with the applicant’s 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group. The 
second obstacle is that even claims with an economic element which can demonstrate such a 
connection are often denied on the basis of a deeply ingrained, but highly problematic, 
assumption that socio-economic drivers of flight make an individual an ‘economic migrant’ 
rather than a refugee.29 This means that deliberate violations of human rights, or the inability 
of one’s state of origin to protect them, may be evidence of the need for international rights 
protection, but this protection is in practice only provided for through acquiring Refugee status 
or, in the EU, Subsidiary Protection status. This is, however, easier said than done.30 
The majority of the concrete demands made by the protestors can be addressed within 
the existing bounds of the refugee protection regime – such as improved conditions for asylum 
seekers while their claims are examined, freedom of movement within Austria and Germany, 
the right to work, access to education, and so on. The broader claims that they make, however, 
cannot be so accommodated as they target the very foundations and boundaries of the regime 
itself, and speak to broader human rights obligations. But even here, the claims and demands 
of the protestors push the boundaries. Their claims signal not just toward existing human rights 
obligations beyond the narrow confines of the refugee regime, but toward a broader 
understanding of human rights obligations in general. In highlighting and contesting the role 
that legal status plays in the ability to enjoy one’s human rights in practice – by circumscribing 
the extent of any given state’s human rights obligations to an individual – the protestors put 
forth an understanding of human rights as a shared responsibility of all states and people to 
ensure.31 Human rights, on this understanding, are not simply the responsibility of one’s state 
of origin and only, in exceptional circumstances – i.e. meeting the stringent criteria of an 
existing legal exception – the responsibility of another state. In other words, rather than 
conforming to the rules of the current system of refugee and human rights protection, premised 
upon communalist (read, state-based) understandings of responsibility and rights, the 
protestors challenge the continued validity/justice of this system, and in this sense can fruitfully 
be understood as Article 28 rights claims. 
 
The entitlement to a social and international order for the realisation of human rights 
 
Article 28 of the UDHR 
Article 28 of the UDHR declares that “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.” The article 
was introduced during the drafting process by the Lebanese member of the Commission on 
Human Rights, Charles Malik, as he felt that it was insufficient merely to enumerate rights 
without also stipulating that “society itself should be of such a nature as to ensure the 
observance of those rights.”32 His original proposal had spoken of the ‘right’ to a social and 
international order, rather than an ‘entitlement to’, and the amendment of the language appears 
to have been suggested for purely stylistic reasons to avoid the repetition of the terminology of 
rights.33 This proposal encountered little opposition and the provision as a whole was adopted 
with minimal debate. 
Article 28 is not explicitly reproduced in either of the binding International Covenants 
opened for signature in 1966 – on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). However, both the Preamble of the ICCPR and ICESCR, and 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR reproduce the spirit of Article 28 in noting that conditions need to 
be created, through international assistance and cooperation, to enable the enjoyment of 
rights.34 Despite the lack of explicit reproduction in the binding Covenants, the importance of 
Article 28 has been recognised by the United Nations, most notably in providing the intellectual 
basis for the right to development. It is explicitly referenced in the 1986 Declaration on the 
Right to Development, which highlights that “efforts at the international level to promote and 
protect human rights should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international 
economic order.”35 Article 28 has also been referenced by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, which monitors the implementation of the ICESCR, noting the problem 
of structural obstacles to the eradication of poverty – such as unsustainable foreign debt and an 
unbalanced financial and trade system – which must be addressed if national anti-poverty 
struggles are to be sustainable.36 Outside of the context of development and poverty reduction, 
however, Article 28 does not seem to have made much of a lasting impression, or at least not 
explicitly. In academic literature on human rights it has been largely forgotten, with a handful 
of exceptions, most notably Thomas Pogge, who uses it to ground his institutional 
understanding of human rights. 
In making reference to the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR, Article 28, Pogge 
explains, addresses the concept of a human right: “they are to be understood as claims on the 
institutional order of any comprehensive social system.”37 Article 28 implies that social 
systems ought to be structured to allow for the fullest possible realisation of human rights, 
allowing for judgments of the moral quality, or justice, of social systems based on the extent 
to which they succeed in affording to all their participants secure access to the objects of their 
human rights.38 For Pogge, a negative duty of justice is violated when an institutional order 
avoidably fails to realise human rights, and those responsible for addressing such violations 
are those of its members who significantly collaborate in its imposition.39 On this account, 
human rights are both claims on an institutional order and against those who collaborate in its 
imposition, adding another dimension to the ‘universality’ of human rights. Under this 
expanded understanding, human rights are universal not only in the sense that all individuals 
are entitled to them by virtue of their human status, but also in the sense of having global 
normative reach: “human rights give persons claims not merely on the institutional order of 
their own societies, which are claims against fellow citizens, but also on the global institutional 
order, which are claims against their fellow human beings.”40 What Article 28 is therefore 
asking of citizens and governments is that they support, and work toward, institutional reforms 
of the global order so that it not only supports the emergence and stability of rights-respecting 
regimes, but that radical economic deprivations and inequalities, which impact on states’ 
abilities to protect human rights,  are reduced.41 Stephen Marks is of the same view when he 
highlights the “revolutionary proposition” inherent in Article 28: that everyone has a right to a 
“radical change in power relations both domestically and internationally, for no political 
economy or legal system on earth today adequately ensures all human rights for everyone, and 
the structures of the international system often inhibit their enjoyment.”42 
Pogge’s claims about the unjust nature of the institutional order, and of the 
responsibilities of citizens for that order have both been subject to critique, particularly within 
the vast literature in political theory on the nature and scope of justice. Even an overview of 
these debates is beyond the scope of this article, but there are two critiques in particular which 
warrant mention here. While the role played by the structure of global political and economic 
life in producing conditions of poverty and catalysts for forced migration is becoming a less 
controversial position, as briefly examined later in this article, there is still academic debate 
over whether or not such a situation gives rise to claims of justice and responsibility, rather 
than merely of charity and humanitarianism, and what actions such claims require. For some, 
what matters most for whether or not duties of justice are owed to the global poor is that an 
institutional order is designed to provide reasonable opportunities for societies to raise 
themselves out of poverty, rather than whether or not such an order foreseeably enables and 
incentivises harm to others. Since some societies have managed to develop economically, and 
relatively quickly, it is not immediately clear that the current order is not like that.43 Perhaps 
more problematic than the question of whether duties of justice are owed to the global poor in 
Pogge’s account, however, is his attribution of causal responsibility to the citizens of western 
states, merely by virtue of their involvement in government – via voting or paying taxes.44 Are 
paying taxes and voting really actions that can, or should, be characterised as “significantly 
collaborating” in the imposition of an unjust order that their governments (re)produce? 
Moreover, Pogge does not adequately explain why it is only citizens of affluent countries that 
appear to bear this responsibility. As Debra Satz points out: “Is a laid-off American 
steelworker, for example, really more responsible for global poverty than a rich citizen of a 
poor country?”45 These critiques of citizen responsibility inform the development of Iris 
Marion Young’s political responsibility model, addressed below, by engaging with the 
question of the responsibility of individuals in relation to the global institutional order not on 
the basis of which state they are citizens of, but on their social positions in relation to such 
injustice – how much power, privilege, interest or collective ability any individual, or group of 
individuals possess in relation to such injustices. 
It would be tempting to read both Pogge and Marks as advocating a responsibility for 
addressing the consequences of the global structural order that it would only be possible to 
discharge by completely removing oneself from all participation in that order. However, neither 
Marks nor Pogge advocate this position. Rather than simply discontinuing all participation in 
such a social and international it is better, Pogge argues, for victims of the injustices that the 
order produces if “we continue participation while also working toward appropriate 
institutional reforms or toward shielding those victims from the harms we also helped to 
produce.”46 In other words, that long-term reform efforts and short-term human rights-based 
protection efforts are engaged in, in pursuit of an international order that more adequately 
protects human rights for all. Returning to the claims and demands made by the protesting 
asylum seekers in Austria and Germany, and in particular to their claims of responsibility, it 
can perhaps now be seen how and why their claims can be understood as Article 28 rights 
claims. 
Protestors’ demands as Article 28 rights claims 
To the author’s knowledge, the protestors themselves have not explicitly invoked Article 28 of 
the UDHR during their protests. However, in what follows, it is suggested that their claims and 
demands resonate very strongly with Article 28, and that Article 28 can be a useful framework 
for understanding and engaging with these claims and demands. 
Both protest movements framed their claims for rights and recognition within 
continental and global socio-economic processes. The refugee regime, and European asylum 
policy, attempt to maintain a strict separation between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ reasons for 
leaving one’s country of origin, recognising only ‘political’ reasons – and then only those 
covered by the nexus clause – as valid for recognition as a refugee. This distinction, or the 
attempt to maintain it, is based upon the assumption that migration on the basis of economic 
considerations is ‘voluntary’ but migration on the basis of political considerations is 
‘involuntary’. This distinction, for the protestors, is untenable for two reasons: first, political 
and socio-economic conditions cannot be so arbitrarily divided, as has been consistently 
demonstrated by forced migration scholars elaborating the migration-asylum nexus;47 and 
second, such separation serves as a tactic for affluent – especially former colonial – states to 
absolve themselves of responsibility for addressing the consequences of their cumulative 
foreign and economic policies. One example of this view is evident in the following statement, 
issued by a protestor, Arash, upon his arrest for violating the Residenzpflicht, in Munich in 
January 2014: 
The reasons for flight and migration are: dictatorships, poverty, oppression and war. Those 
causes, forcing people to flee, have their roots in the mutual relations between countries of 
origin and destination […] [and] formed in this globalised economic system and the 
resulting distribution struggles over resources and power. The resulting imbalance is the 
main reason for displacement and migration. The existence of this system is made possible 
by a network of neo-colonial exploitation and oppression. That circuit is formed by both 
the ‘democratic’ and/or ‘liberal’ states, and maintained by dictatorial states. In countries 
such as […] Iran and Pakistan, the system is protected with a visible state violence. In 
countries such as Germany and France, the same system is protected with 100 billion Euros 
of arms exports.48 
In drawing attention to the links between European social, economic and military policies, and 
the situations from which they have fled, the protestors seek to ground their claims for rights 
beyond the criteria of the Refugee Convention by foregrounding the interconnected nature of 
global economics and politics and its impact on their ability to enjoy their human rights. In a 
press release explaining why they initiated the protests, the members of Refugee Tent Action 
stated that: 
The struggle against the capitalist isolation system is an important fight for our future. We 
do not want to live in refugee camps, in which we are isolated. We do not want to be 
victims of racist measures […] We want to connect our struggle with all anti-capitalist and 
anti-fascist forces, with all our comrades in the streets of the world. We do not want to pay 
the bill for the wars and crises of the capitalist-imperialist system.49 
Actively connecting their protests for rights and recognition with protest movements 
throughout the world for a more equitable international order, the protestors link their rights 
claims to the (re)production of fundamental inequalities in the international system. But the 
protestors not only claim that the global North plays a significant role in the (re)production of 
this system and therefore in their predicament, but that the North’s implication in these 
processes produces a responsibility to provide rights protection, rather than reserving such 
protection only for those whose circumstances of flight are covered by currently existing 
international protection instruments. In response to a wave of deportations in December 2013, 
the protestors in Austria issued a statement in which they called upon all members of the global 
North to recognise and act on this responsibility: 
There are a lot of different problems and threats from which people are fleeing. So-called 
‘democratic’ western countries actively produce reasons to flee by destroying other 
countries through wars, economic exploitation and supporting authoritarian and murderous 
regimes. Everyone in the ‘western world’ is responsible for not looking away and showing 
solidarity!50 
The broader point being made by the protestors, then, is not simply that many of them come 
from states which cannot guarantee protection of their human rights, although this is, of course, 
also true.51 It is, rather, that the political, economic, and social structures of the international 
system play a crucial role in preventing the enjoyment of human rights in many states, that this 
precipitates forced migration, and that, if the international community takes human rights as 
seriously as it claims to, then the protestors’ entitlement to their human rights must be 
recognised, and protection of those rights provided. The protestors argue that access to the 
system of surrogate rights protection that the refugee regime provides, since it is the only such 
system currently existing, should not be limited only to those who can meet the restrictive 
definition of a Refugee in the 1951 Convention. This is not to claim that all migrants are 
refugees and, thus, to dispense with the category, or meaning, of ‘refugee’ altogether. It is, 
rather, to draw attention to the restrictive nature of Refugee status and the way in which access 
to international rights protection is not based upon the lack of rights protection itself but upon 
an individual’s ability to show that the reason they lack rights protection is a reason currently 
recognised in the Refugee Convention.52  But, more than this, the protestors also claim that the 
international community must address the structural issues that cause forced migration. In other 
words, they must recognise the entitlement to a social and international order in which the 
realisation of rights is possible, and begin to work toward it. 
Within the forced migration literature it is becoming the norm to recognise that strictly 
‘internalist’ explanations of forced migration are inadequate and that focus must also be placed 
on ‘externalist’ causes,53 but the internalist paradigm still holds a powerful grip on many 
theorists and policy-makers. Nevertheless, the connections that the protestors highlight 
between these conditions, outside actors, and forced migration, have been recognised in the 
past, most notably by the United Nations. In 1981, for example, the Special Rapporteur 
appointed by the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights to study the question of 
human rights and mass exoduses submitted a report stating that: 
It is abundantly clear that unless ways can be found to counteract the withholding of, or 
outright violations of, human rights, unless there is a more equitable sharing of the world’s 
resources, more restraint and tolerance, the granting to everyone […] the right to belong – 
or alternatively to move in an orderly fashion to seek work, decent living conditions and 
freedom from strife – the world will continue to have to live with the problem of mass 
exodus.54 
At the same time, the General Assembly had appointed a Group of Governmental Experts on 
International Co-Operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, which found that economic and 
social factors that threaten physical integrity and survival are not only a cause of past 
migrations (and were predicted to be a cause of future migrations), but that, in a number of 
developing states, “they are generally the result of the prolongation of the state of under-
development inherited from colonialism and aggravated by a difficult economic 
environment.”55 
Returning to Pogge’s explanation of Article 28, and what it appears to require, the 
similarities with the broader claims and demands that the protestors make become clearer. To 
bring about a social and international order in which human rights can be fully realised requires 
that fundamental institutional reforms at the social and international levels be supported and 
worked toward and that, while this process develops, the victims of such systemic injustice are 
shielded from the harms that the system produces. The protestors’ broader claims and demands 
are claims, fundamentally, for such long-term reforms, and their more immediate demands – 
those that can be accommodated within the refugee regime – can be understood as demands, 
in the short-term, to the shields of which Pogge speaks. The refugee regime, and its 
accompanying legal status of Refugee, is the only currently existing system of surrogate rights 
protection – or shield – for those forced to flee their homes. Understanding the protestors’ 
claims and demands as Article 28 rights claims provides a powerful argument that they can 
and should be entitled to this system of surrogate protection, while the structural obstacles of 
the current order to human rights fulfilment globally are addressed.56 But engaging with these 
claims and demands is, fundamentally, a question of responsibility, and it is to this question 
that this paper now turns. 
Political Responsibility for Structural Injustice 
None of the accounts of responsibility for refugees outlined in section one seem adequate to 
work through the challenging questions raised by the protestors. As has been shown, the 
protestors have much more to say about the nexus between human rights, injustice, and forced 
migration than traditional theories of responsibility for refugees, which take the state as the 
starting point, isolate the relationship between the state and the forced migrant from the 
surrounding structural context, and reduce the complexity of the forced migrant’s search for 
rights protection to the asylum claim. Therefore, it may be more helpful to turn to a 
conceptualisation of responsibility which is, on the surface, unrelated to the experience of 
forced migration: Iris Marion Young’s understanding of political responsibility for structural 
injustice.   
Structural injustice and responsibility 
Structural injustice is a particular kind of injustice which presents intellectual and practi
challenges. Structural injustice differs from the wrongful action of a particular individual agent. 
It exists when 
social processes [themselves the creation of a multitude of past and present actors, rather 
than any single actor] put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of 
domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the 
same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of 
opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities.57 
Rather than being the outcome of any one individual action, structural injustice occurs as a 
consequence of “many individuals and institutions acting in pursuit of their particular goals or 
interests, within given institutional rules and accepted norms.”58 All the actors who actively 
participate in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute these structures are 
responsible for them, in the sense that they are part of the process that causes them. But, 
importantly, they are not responsible in the sense of having directed the process or intended its 
outcomes.59 Young differentiates her model of political responsibility for structural injustice 
from what she refers to as the liability model – of legal systems and much normative political 
theory – which appears to require that a direct relationship be traced between the action of an 
identifiable person or group and a specific harm in order to assign blame or guilt, and from 
which redress or punishment would follow. With structural injustice, however, “it is often not 
possible to trace which specific actions of which specific agents cause which specific parts of 
the structural processes and their outcomes,”60 and so another way to conceptualise 
responsibility is needed. Young’s model consists of five features which distinguish it from the 
liability model. 
First, whereas a liability model seeks to isolate some responsible parties so as to absolve 
others, the identification of responsibility under the political responsibility model does not. 
There may be instances when singling out a single state, or other entity, as liable for a particular 
wrong is both possible and desirable, and in such cases the liability model should be applied, 
but when harms result from the participation of a great many individuals and collectives in 
institutions and practices which produce injustice, such an isolating model of responsibility is 
inadequate on its own to address these harms. Second, under the liability model, harms that 
deviate from normal or acceptable social/legal/political procedures are those for which 
responsibility is assigned, whereas under the political responsibility model it is precisely these 
background conditions that are brought into question. Third, although any attribution of 
responsibility carries multiple temporalities – no model is entirely backward- or forward-
looking – there is a difference in temporal emphasis between the liability and political models. 
The injustices that social structures produce have not reached some end-point in their 
development, but are on-going, and so intervention is needed moving forward in order to 
change them. The point of political responsibility for structural injustice is not strictly, 
therefore, to compensate for the past, but for all who contribute to the ongoing processes that 
produce injustice to work to transform these processes into the future.61 Fourth, political 
responsibility is, fundamentally, a shared responsibility. An agent shares political 
responsibility with others whose actions contribute to the structural processes that produce 
injustice. It is a responsibility that an agent may personally bear, but they bear it alongside 
many others who bear it also. If forward-looking responsibility consists in changing the 
institutions and processes that lead to unjust outcomes in the hope of producing outcomes that 
are less unjust moving forward, then no one actor can do this alone, and so this shared 
responsibility requires collective action in order to be discharged effectively.62 Finally, in 
distinction to a duty, political responsibility is relatively open with regard to the actions that 
count as taking up responsibility, allowing for judgment by different actors according to what 
the responsibilities are for, the capabilities of agents, and the content of action: different actors 
can discharge their responsibilities in different ways and, contra Pogge, the bearing of this 
responsibility is not dependent upon one’s citizenship but one’s relationship to the structural 
processes producing injustice.63 While all five aspects of this model resonate with the 
protestors’ claims and demands as Article 28 rights claims, there are three aspects in particular 
worth highlighting: the shared nature of such responsibility, its focus on structures and 
processes, and its forward-looking orientation. 
In contrast to the liability model of responsibility, which seeks to isolate specific actors 
who bear responsibility rooted in concrete past actions so as to absolve others, the political 
model is essentially shared. Neither forced migration, nor the inequalities and injustices which 
result from the structures of the international system, are caused by one, or even a handful, of 
readily identifiable actors; nor can distinct causal chains between specific actions and specific 
outcomes necessarily be traced. Where such connections can be traced, the liability model – 
such as Souter’s conception of asylum as reparation for past injustice64 – may well be more 
appropriate and should be pursued. The political responsibility model is not a replacement for 
the liability model, but tracing such connections will often not be possible. Rather than giving 
up on the concept of responsibility entirely due to such complexities, Young posits that 
responsibility is shared by all those who are in some way involved in the structural processes 
that produce injustice (including one’s state of origin).65 Young, thus, argues for a ‘two-tiered’ 
approach to thinking about responsibility: our responsibility for specific actions or omissions 
that have resulted in harm to identifiable others (liability), and our on-going responsibility to 
address unjust structures (political). Returning to the responsibility claims made by the 
protestors reveals such an understanding of responsibility at work. At first glance their claims 
may appear only to draw on a liability model: the North bears responsibility because of their 
implication in the production of the conditions from which the protestors have fled. However, 
the protestors also speak of “structures”, “networks”, “orders”, “circuits”, and “mutual 
relations”. They connect their struggle with the struggle of others fighting for a more just and 
equitable international system, and situate the problem of forced migration within a broader 
human rights discourse, revealing not only an understanding of the complexity of global 
structural processes which belies a simplistic approach to the question of responsibility, but 
also a broader understanding of the problem in need of our attention: it is not just about asylum, 
but about the fact that the international system as it currently exists cannot assure human rights 
for everyone, and needs reforming. This would indicate that the protestors’ own states origin, 
the states of the global North, but also the institutions of the global financial system, for 
example, could be understood as contributing to the perpetuation of the unjust structures and, 
thereby, bear some responsibility toward addressing them. 
The protestors’ claims also resonate strongly with the forward-looking nature of 
political responsibility.  The primary purpose of political responsibility is not, strictly, to 
redress past wrongs, but to intervene moving forward in the processes that produce unjust 
outcomes: we have this responsibility, Young explains, “always now, in relation to current 
events and in relation to their future consequences.”66 Poverty, dictatorship, oppression, and 
war are complex processes which are often not caused by any one actor, and hence are shared, 
but are also processes that have not reached some end-point. They are on-going and will 
continue absent any meaningful action moving forward, and it is in taking this action that 
shared responsibility can be discharged. The focus that the protestors place on the structures of 
international politics and global economics – the social and international order to which Article 
28 refers – and the connections they make between their struggle and the struggles of others, 
indicate a belief that these structures, and the injustices they cause, are likely to continue absent 
intervention. Demanding respect of their human rights, and appealing to the broader human 
rights framework also indicates that responsibility for addressing their lack of rights protection, 
and the complex causes of it, can perhaps be grounded in the human rights project itself. After 
all, the provision and protection of human rights is itself also an on-going process, which does 
not end with their codification on paper. They must actively and continually be worked toward, 
protected, and enacted in everyday life. This too, is an on-going project, and one to which the 
majority of states have formally pledged themselves.  And so, while the global North, or “the 
western world”, bears a responsibility, in part, for its past actions, it also bears a shared 
responsibility moving forward: a responsibility to make, in line with Article 28, meaningful 
changes in the structures of the international system to enable the realisation of human rights 
globally. These changes, and the responsibility to make them, can be grounded in the human 
rights project to which the global North, as the protestors in Germany point out, has freely 
committed itself, and the recognition that the domestic provision of human rights is never 
solely in the hands of any one state.  But there is one further aspect of the shared nature of 
political responsibility that warrants attention before concluding: that it can only be discharged 
effectively through collective action, in which solidarity (and its cultivation) plays a crucial 
role, but also presents a distinct challenge. 
Solidarity, acknowledgement, and political responsibility 
That this shared responsibility can only be taken up effectively through collective action is 
what makes political responsibility for structural injustice political, and it is here that Young 
owes her greatest debt to Hannah Arendt. Rather than the work of professional politicians, or 
the infrequent act of voting, politics is, both for Young and Arendt, action in common – by 
diverse individuals, in pursuit of a common goal. It is a collective activity – an activity which 
constitutes a collective through its very exercise – through which individuals take responsibility 
for the world and their (our) mutually inter-dependent existence within it. It may be that 
collective action can, in some cases, best be organised by means of state institutions, but in 
many other cases such action can be taken independently of them. Indeed, alongside the 
protests of asylum seekers in Europe has been an explosion of local initiatives not mediated by 
the state in which individuals from all walks of life come together to address not only the 
concrete problems that refugees and asylum seekers face but also to protest and mobilise 
against the same restrictive policies that are the focus of the asylum seekers’ protests. It may 
certainly be true that without state action individuals can only go so far in tackling structural 
injustice,67 but it is also true that the most powerful agents within any given social structure 
will often have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. And so it is often necessary to 
exert pressure on them to move them to act and to guard against superficial action on their 
part.68 Political responsibility for structural injustice is, then, in essence, a responsibility to be 
political in relation to structural injustice. It is here that the protestors’ call to the people of 
Austria, Germany, the EU, and “the western world” takes on particular salience: “You are 
citizens who support our demands. Therefore, why don’t you demand that your political 
representatives – who you, as citizens, have elected – change this unbearable situation?!”69 
“Everyone in the “western world” is responsible for not looking away and showing 
solidarity!”70 
This invocation of solidarity is central to the collective action necessary to address 
structural injustice. Solidarity, for Arendt, is the principle that ought to motivate political 
action. It does not rely on essentialist and, thus, exclusionary notions of group identity. It is, 
rather, world-building. It provides a means by which a relationship can be established between 
people who suffer and people who decide to address this suffering, by establishing a 
community of interest with the oppressed.71 Similarly, for Young solidarity is a relationship 
among separate and dissimilar actors who decide to stand together, for one another: “unlike 
brotherhood, which appeals to a natural origin in the unspoken mother, already there to be 
counted on, solidarity must always be forged and re-forged.”72 Solidarity is necessary precisely 
because political responsibility does not derive from or depend upon membership in a 
particular social, ethnic, racial, national group or class. Tackling structural injustice requires 
the collective action of diverse and differentially situated individuals and groups in pursuit of 
the common goal of creating more just structures. 
However, the responsibility to be political, to organise collectively to intervene in 
unjust processes so as to reform them moving forward, requires that agentss recognise the 
existence of structural injustice, and recognise and reflect upon the role they may, albeit 
inadvertently, play in it. Young does briefly highlights four strategies used by individuals and 
institutions to distance themselves from responsibility, even when they may recognise that 
there are structural injustices,73 but in focusing on strategies of avoidance after recognising 
structural injustice, Young overlooked the primary problem of recognition itself: the problem 
that actually assuming responsibility for structural injustice requires that individuals and 
groups first acknowledge and experience their implication in it. Recognising, and responding, 
to structural injustice is a problem precisely because of the nature of structural injustice itself: 
it is “so pervasive, so quotidian, that our connections to it tend to pass unnoticed”.74 Schiff 
addresses the problem of recognition and responsiveness by focusing on “crises” which, 
because they tend to disrupt our experiences of the ordinary, can draw our attention 
productively back to those experiences, concentrating our attention on structural processes and 
our role in perpetuating them.75 The protests of asylum seekers and refugees in Europe can be 
seen to play a similar role in relation to enabling the recognition of, and responsiveness to, the 
structural injustice that precipitates forced migration. Social/political change not only requires 
engaging in public discussions that reflect on the working of structural processes and 
publicising the harms experienced by those who these processes and structures disadvantage. 
It requires, first, taking special efforts to make a break in these processes.76 This, arguably, is 
precisely what the protestors do in taking to the streets and parks of Europe. They make 
themselves visible and call on the citizens of Austria, Germany, and “the western world” to 
join them in their struggle for rights and recognition.  
In this way, the protestors also take upon themselves what perhaps might be considered 
the most controversial aspect of Young’s conception of political responsibility for structural 
injustice: that this shared responsibility, and the collective action necessary to discharge it, also 
includes the victims of structural injustice. Young argues that their social positions offer 
victims of injustice a unique understanding of the nature of the problems in need of attention 
and intervention, and the likely effects of policies and actions proposed by others situated in 
more powerful and privileged positions.77 Interestingly, the protestors themselves appear to 
recognise that they too share this responsibility: “[t]o bring this inhuman system to an end, and 
to stop deportations, we have to organise and to take to the streets. We have to put pressure on 
those in power, but at the same time get active ourselves. We are all responsible.”78 
 
Conclusion 
The claims, demands and the questions of responsibility, raised by these protestors are 
uncomfortable ones, with no simple answers, and raise numerous practical questions and 
challenges. But the fact that such claims and demands are uncomfortable and complicated to 
work through and address is not a reason to dismiss them outright. This article has attempted 
to engage with them, and has argued that these claims and demands can usefully be understood 
as Article 28 rights claims – as claims to a social and international order in which human rights 
can be fully realised. Putting forward Iris Marion Young’s model of political responsibility for 
structural injustice, this article has argued that the shared nature of this responsibility, its focus 
on structures and processes, and its forward-looking orientation, provide a promising 
framework within which to begin to engage with the claims and demands beyond asylum – for 
rights, recognition, and of responsibility – of the protestors. As such, this article is only a 
starting point, not a blueprint for concrete actions. Indeed, to provide such a blueprint would 
go against the grain of Young’s conceptualisation of political responsibility and the importance 
it places on reflecting on one’s own potential position, role, and capabilities in relation to the 
continued (re)production of structural injustice, and debating and working with others on how 
best to respond, on the basis of these positions, roles, and capabilities. 
The wager of this article, thus, has been that there is much to be gained in terms of 
understanding the issues at stake in the protection of the human rights of forced migrants if 
these issues are placed back within a larger structural context; if the position, and voices, of 
forced migrants themselves is taken as the starting point; and if broader issues of human rights 
are put centre stage. As the analysis above demonstrates, the protesting refugees and asylum 
seekers in Germany and Austria do far more than make a claim for physical asylum necessitated 
by an unwillingness of their state of origin to protect their human rights. The connections that 
they make between the politico-economic situations in their countries of origin, and the 
economic and political structures of the international system presents a challenge to move 
beyond a narrow root causes approach to forced migration, which often aims simply to contain 
it, and toward a more honest reckoning the geopolitical, economic and developmental 
challenges that generate it.79 In drawing attention to the structures and processes that govern 
the international system, and the ways in which it fails to adequately ensure the protection of 
their human rights, the protestors also present an important challenge to traditional debates 
about global responsibilities, positing a wider range of possible responsibility bearers than the 
state, and thus potentially opening new avenues for reform by engaging with a more diverse 
group of actors, including ordinary citizens of the global north. Finally, by explicitly asserting 
themselves as rights-bearers, and, on this basis, claiming a right to the legal status of ‘Refugee’ 
when they may not fit the narrow legal definition in the Refugee Convention, they bring into 
focus the disparity between the need for rights protection and the conditions under which 
current protection mechanisms are made available. In doing so they reframe the issue of 
protection of the rights of forced migrants as an unresolved question of justice, and highlight 
the need to take seriously the promise and challenge of Article 28: that everyone is entitled to 
a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR can be 
fully realised.  
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